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Abstract: This paper reveals that there has been a continuous political confrontation between two archrival 
political forces in Bangladesh since independence in 1971. In the course of the confrontation, the country has 
seemingly been divided into two forces: BAL forces and anti-BAL forces. The democratic development in this 
country since 1991 is a by-product of this confrontation. In 1991, because of the continued mistrust between 
the two confronting forces, a unique system of interim government (non-party caretaker government) was 
produced that kept working as a catalyst of power transfer in a democratic way from one government to 
another till 2008 election from 1991. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two most attractive attributes of democracy are that it works or attempted to work in favour of at least the 
majority of a country (Vanhanen, 2003) and allows everybody to become a part of the ‘’majority’’ through 
open competition. In democratic competion, parties and leaders theoretically are like commodities in a free 
market economy, where the quality of the commodities and market forces determine prices. Therefore, Azad 
(2004) terms democracy as self-operated system as it just needs a free but disciplined society to run. Despite 
these wooing features, democracy has never been free of criticisms. One of these criticisms is that democracy 
leaves minority somewhat open to victimisation by majority. Besides, well-off individuals and parties have 
more opportunities to get elected than the poor ones because money is generally powerful enough to earn 
party nominations and popular votes as well. Nontheless, democracy from the ancient  Greek city states 
(Wollheim, 1958) through the French Revolution (Wejnert, 2005) and the American Declaration of 
Independence in eithteen century proliferated across the world. Although most of the early democracies 
could not survive, a steady increase in the number of democratic transitions, specially over the last three 
decades (Doyle, 1983; Fukuyama, 1992; Grassi, 2002; Gurr, Jagger, & Moore, as cited in Wejnert, 2005), 
posted general acceptance and importance of democracy against autocracy. Bangladesh, predominantly a 
Muslim country with democratic constitution, was a part of Indian state of Bengal until Pakistan was born and 
included it by dividing India in 1947. It won independence from Pakistan in 1971. Just after less than four 
years of independence, military took over the country’s state power in August 1975, since when direct and 
indirect military rules had prolonged for the next 15 years. A democratic transition took place in this country 
in 1991 following the fall of last military dictator General (Rtd.) Hussein Muhammad Ershad in the face of a 
massive political upheaval at the end of 1990. Since 1991, governments have mostly changed through 
generally accepted elections. Generally, two leading parties, Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP), have been ruling the country alternately. However, these two parties have been 
involved in politics of confrontation that leads to dysfunctional or ineffective parliament (Moniruzzaman, 
2009), and malfunctioning of democracy (Majumder, n.d.). However, at the same time, major democracy 
measures (e.g. Freedom House, n.d; Polity, n.d; CSCW, n.d.) have presented Bangladesh as a democratic 
country in general since 1991.  Against this backdrop, some questions are generated: What has been the root-
cause of political confrontation in Bangladesh? What factor/s actually drove democratisation in this country 
and what trend of democratisation the country has been witnessing? To answer these questions, this paper, 
in fact, attempts to theorise about Bangladesh democracy.   
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A large part of democratisation literature (e.g. Schumpeter, 1947; Huntington, 1968; Lipset, 1959; O’Donnell, 
1973; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Moore 1966; Lerner, 1958; Rostow, 1960; Apter 1965; Rowen, 1995: 
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52; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Geddes 1999; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005) shows that modernisation or economic 
development is a major factor of democratisation. Therefore, democratisation literature could be divided into 
two broadly based sections: economic factors and other factors. Other factors focused in the literature are: 
social, cultural or multivariate (Huntington, 1991),  impact of  economic crisis on authoritarian regime 
(Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995), economic liberalisation (Cui, 1997), global flow of democratisation and 
geographic proximity (O'Loughlin et al,.1998; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000), role of America (Cox, Ikenberry &  
Inoguchi, 2000); EU role (Rupnik, 2000),  pro-democracy political institutions (Prezworski et al, 2000; Rose 
and Shin, 2001); NATO expansion (Barany, 2004); distribution of power and resources in society (Vanhanen, 
2004); honest and competent public bureaucracies (Harris, 2004); Foreign aid (Gazibo, 2005); IMF’s 
influence (Nelson & Wallace, 2005; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006). Negative factors of democratisation 
included development of political personality cults (Venter, 2003); and competitive authoritarian regimes 
(e.g. hybrid regime in Singapore) (Brownlee, 2009). Bangladesh political literature has so far focused 
primarily on political instability and secondarily the 1991 democratic transition as a short-term event rather 
than on the trend of democratisation. There has been few theoretically grounded works on determinants and 
trend of the country’s democratisation; most writings could be termed as historical descriptions (Khan and 
Husain, 1996; Ali, 2006; Jahan, 2003; Jahan, 2004; Rashiduzzaman, 2001; Ahmed, 2003; Ahmed, 2001; 
Kochanek, 2000). In the view Maniruzzaman (1992), the autocratic government fell at the end of 1990 
because President General (Rtd.) Hussein Mohammad Ershad failed to maintain good relationships with the 
military, intellectuals, students, and major political parties. Actually, the fall of the then autocratic regime is 
mostly attributed to a student-led mass upsurge, withdrawal of military support from President Ershad and 
the Western donor community’s threat to reduce their aid levels on the grounds of corruption (Kochanek, 
2000). Moreover, at crucial moments in 1987, 1990 and 1996 civil society advocacies played important roles 
in so that politicians became united in opposition to the government and then successfully reformed the 
country’s political institutions (Wilkinson, 2000). Lee (2002) also identifies political protests as a primary 
cause of democratisation and found no relationships between economic development and democratisation in 
Bangladesh. It is very evident that instability is a major political phenomenon in Bangladesh, which impedes 
good governance and democratisation, and that the root of this phenomenon is confrontation between two 
main political forces (Kochanek, 2000).  In an investigation into this political instability, Hossain (2000) 
argues that confrontational politics of two leading political parties, the BAL and the BNP, demonstrates such a 
political culture where both the parties seek to own state power and do not tolerate each other at all. Ahmed 
(2003) observes that the system of a non-party caretaker government; external factors such as international 
election observers and donors; and democratic motivation have played key roles in democratisation in 
Bangladesh. However, due to a dominant tendency of the two leaders, BAL chief Sheikh Hasina and BNP chief 
Khaleda Zia, democracy in the country could not have reached the desired level.   
 
3. Methodology  
 
The research question of this study is: what factor/s drove democratisation in Bangladesh.  Our hypothesis is: 
Democracy in Bangladesh is a by-product of political confrontation between two archrival political forces. To 
investigate this question/ hypothesis, our approach is mixed-statistical and political historical that cover the 
period starting from the country’s independence year 1971 to the recent past.  
 
4. Analysis/ Investigation 
 
Since economic development as a factor of democratisation is at the forefront of the literature review, we at 
first check for impact of economic development on democracy in Bangladesh for the period of 1972-2010 
using a scatter plot. In the scatter plot, we used GDP per capita data as indicator of economic development, 
and the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberty data as the indicator of democracy. In the scatter 
plot test, economic development (GDP per capita) is found to have a weak effect on democratisation (Figure 
1) implying that there were some factors other than economic development, which have had a strong impact 
on democratisation in Bangladesh.  
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Figure 1: The weak positive effect of economic development (GDP per capita in US$) on democracy in 
Bangladesh, 1972-2010 
 
Noting the weak influence of economic development, we opt for political historical investigation. We carry out 
historical investigation with a clue from Chowdhury (2006) who found a division in voters in Bangladesh. In 
his view, generally voters were in part either pro-BAL or anti-BAL. This view led to the development of our 
concept of a national political divide as applied in this study.  
 
Quantitative data: GDP per capita data used in this study are GDP of Bangladesh in current prices in US 
dollars divided by the population of the county (“UN Stat Conversions and Formulas”, n.d.). The GDP data are 
for 39 years from 1972 to 2010 and all of these data are secondary. These data were collected from UN 
Statistics Division (UN Stat, n.d.). Democracy data are also secondary and for 1972-2010 period1. Each year’s 
scores of Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberty (Freedom House, n.d.) data about Bangladesh were 
aggregated to produce a democracy score, which ranged from 14-2 points. Then, because the lower figures 
represent bigger values in the original numerical Freedom House data, the figures were rearranged (Table 1) 
so that the larger figures represented larger values to help with the interpretation. Thus, on the 2-14 point 
scale, “2” means least democracy while “14” means most democracy.  
 
Table 1: Transformation of Freedom House Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) ratings (7-1) 
for Bangladesh into 2-14 Bangladesh democracy index, 1972-2010    
Year PR CL Democracy (14-2) Democracy (2-14) 
 1972 2 4 6 10 
 1973 4 4 8 8 
 1974 4 4 8 8 
 1975 7 5 12 4 
 1976 7 4 11 5 
 1977 6 4 10 6 
 1978 4 4 8 8 
 
                                                 
1 Since Bangladesh fought a bloody war of independence from March to December 1971, we have ignored the 
collection of the country’s economic and democracy for the year. 
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1989 3 3 6 10 
 1980 3 4 7 9 
 1981 5 5 10 6 
 1982 6 5 11 5 
 1983 6 5 11 5 
 1984 5 5 10 6 
 1985 4 5 9 7 
 1986 4 5 9 7 
 1987 4 5 9 7 
 1988 4 4 8 8 
 1989 5 5 10 6 
 1990 5 5 10 6 
 1991 2 3 5 11 
 1992 2 3 5 11 
 1993 2 4 6 10 
 1994 2 4 6 10 
 1995 3 4 7 9 
 1996 2 4 6 10 
 1997 2 4 6 10 
 1998 2 4 6 10 
 1999 3 4 7 9 
 2000 3 4 7 9 
 2001 3 4 7 9 
 2002 4 4 8 8 
 2003 4 4 8 8 
 2004 4 4 8 8 
 2005 4 4 8 8 
 2006 4 4 8 8 
 2007 5 4 9 7 
 2008 4 4 8 8 
 2009 3 4 7 9 
 2010 3 4 7 9 
 Source: These researchers construct 2-14 points Bangladesh democracy index, 1072-2010 on  
The basis of Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties scales for Bangladesh  
                                                                                                                                       
Qualitative data: Qualitative data used for historical investigation in this study are secondary as well and 
cover the same period of 39 years. These data sources include books, journal articles, magazine and 
newspaper articles and news, website documents, etc. We organise our study by dividing it into some 
sections under the headings: Introduction, Literature, Methodology, The democracy: Bangladesh style, 
Confrontational politics: Tools for fighting each other, and the National political divide, Discussion; and we 
then conclude. 
 
The democracy: Bangladesh style: It is observed that the two-archrival political forces – one is led by the 
BAL and the other by BNP -- reached a unique consensus in 1990 to set up a non-party caretaker government 
(CG)2. In 1991, the country’s first widely acceptable free and fair election was held under the CG and the 
country attained its highest degree of democracy (Freedom, n.d.). Under the supervision of this type of 
interim government, the four parliamentary elections held in the years 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2008 were by 
                                                 
2
 The CG was at first constituted for holding the 1991 general elections only.  Then, in 1996, the BNP-led 
government had to make permanent constitutional provision for this sort of interim government as a BAL-led 
alliance waged a political upheaval demanding it. In 2011, the system was abolished and, accordingly, the 
next general election is supposed to be held under party government.    
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and large free, fair and generally accepted though  losing major parties criticised the election results every 
time.  Except two years of state of emergency during the rule of an army-backed government in 2007 and 
2008, the general trend has not been undemocratic since the 1991 transition as the system of CG was still 
working somehow for generally acceptable national elections and having a positive influence on democracy. 
In fact, what democracy virtually has meant in Bangladesh is only formation of government through 
parliamentary election under a CG. After forming government, the parliament becomes dysfunctional or 
ineffective because of the long drawn absence of main opposition party; the Opposition takes to the street 
with destructive behaviour and demands resignation of the elected government; then the ruling party 
allegedly uses government mechanisms to repress the Opposition, etc.  These have been the most common 
political phenomena3 since the so-called democratic transition took place in 1991. Under the circumstances, 
we would like to term the system of CG as the result of a unique agreement of disagreements between the two 
conflicting political forces as this system worked as an umpire between the two forces during general 
elections.  
 
Confrontational politics: Tools for fighting each other: Apart from the unique consensus in 1991, the 
confronting political forces have used two tools to fight each other: direct undemocratic tools mostly used 
during the period until the democratic transition took place in 1991; and indirect undemocratic tools have 
mostly been in use since democratic transition took place. Those tools have been used in order to achieve and 
remain in power or to block opponent forces from achieving or remaining in power; or to unseat the sitting 
opponent government.  
 
Direct undemocratic tools: Direct undemocratic tools generally appeared tyrannical and went directly 
against democracy. The main such undemocratic tools used for political gains were the (1) cancellation of 
voting rights of some people who collaborated with Pakistani forces during the war of independence in 1971;  
(2) banning religion-based political parties in 1972; (3) introduction of one-party system in 1975; and (4)  all 
the military coups.  
 
Indirect undemocratic tools: Indirect undemocratic tools have been generally based on political cunning 
and disguised as democratic. The main such indirect undemocratic tools used for political gains are: 1) 
financial corruption; 2) abuse of democratic rights; and 3) political corruption. Each of these mechanisms is 
explained below. 
 
Financial corruption: The conflicting political forces have considered money as one of the key factors in 
winning elections. Because of this, they gave priority to nominating candidates with money in elections. “The 
political parties nominate hoodlums, businessmen and unscrupulous industrialists as candidates for winning 
parliamentary and other elections” (Akram & Das, 2006). Political parties very often have broken the period 
and gone over the set limit for spending money in electioneering (Akram & Das, 2007). Generating money by 
using government positions in Bangladesh seems to be quite easy as it was rated world’s most corrupt 
country for five consecutive years until 2005 (Transparency International, n. d.). Thus, we are convinced that 
financial corruption has been a double-edge sword: Political parties spend big amounts of money in 
electioneering to influence election results and, when in power, try to earn more than they spend using their 
positions.  
 
Abuse of party rights: Political parties have taken advantages of some of their democratic rights by abusing 
them. These rights are general strikes (locally called hartal), blockades, public meetings and rallies, and 
boycotts of parliament. Both the rival political forces, while in opposition, use these democratic rights as an 
instrument in a bid to drag down an elected government instead of waiting for next election (Rahman, 1993 
as cited in Rahman, 2001). They enforce general strikes and blockades in order to press the government to 
meet their demands. During these protest actions, all sorts of economic activities, modes of transport, and 
government and private offices suffer a lot. The country was shut down for more than 300 days in the 1990s 
during the two political regimes (Hossain, 2004). General strikes were costing Bangladesh around $80 million 
per day and became the symbol of Bangladesh's economic and social paralysis (Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada, 1996). 
                                                 
3 For explanation, see Hossain, 2000; Rahman, 2001; UNDP, 2005; Moniruzzaman, 2009; and Osman, 2010.  
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Political corruption: Political corruption can be regarded as more detrimental to a society than any other 
forms of corruption as it can illegally help transfer political power to an unaccountable person, group or 
party. However, this study has found no instances of punishment to any persons or organisations involved in 
political corruption in Bangladesh, although occasionally some people receive some sort of punishment or at 
least face trial for financial corruption. Such political corruptions found in the history of Bangladesh are: 1) 
the hastily passed 4th amendment to the constitution; 2) legalising military coups; 3) government 
recruitments and postings of partisan people to do election-related jobs which would then favour one of the 
two confronting political forces; 4) preparation of fake voter rolls; 5) politicisation of CG; and 6) alleged 
partisan move to cancel the system of CG. Each of these actions violated the fundamental democratic principle 
that the people are the owners of a country and they have to be free to choose their representatives and make 
decisions on necessary issues in a free and fair manner to run the state affairs. The BAL, with more than two-
thirds majority, moved the 4th Amendment to the Constitution bill on 25 January 1975 in Parliament and just 
in 70 minutes time it was passed by voice votes the same day (Huq, 1994). This amendment, on one hand, 
transformed the country’s multiparty democracy to a one party system and, on the other hand, altered a 
parliamentary form of government to a presidential one. At least 12 military coups4 occurred during the 
period under study, which completely went against basic democratic rules. Among those only three (15 
August 1975, 7 November 1975 and 24 March 1982) are considered successful as their leaders survived and 
ruled the country for a considerable period of time. In all cases of unsuccessful military coups, the coup 
leaders and participants faced trial in court martial and many of them received capital punishment. In 
contrast, none of the three successful coup leaders have so far been tried for toppling a government or 
illegally taking control of the government. Rather, they had the unsuccessful coup leaders tried and their own 
coups and rules made legal through constitutional amendment.  
 
General Ziaur Rahman, who emerged as the supreme leader after the 7 November 1975 coup, got his own 
party and political alliance established and elected to the Parliament that legalised all his and the previous 
coup leaders’ actions including coups. The 1982 coup leader General Ershad followed General Zia’s way of 
legalising his role as coup leader and ruler of the country. Then, after coming to power in 1991, the BNP, from 
which General Ershad took power by force, arranged the trial of Ershad for a number of solely financial 
corruption cases. In turn, when the BAL came to power in 1996, it removed the legal barriers to bringing to 
trial those responsible for the killing of founder of the nation and former BAL chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
and his family members. It also got some financial corruption cases filed against the Prime Minister of the 
BNP government, Khaleda Zia. Other than these killing and financial corruption cases, no actions have been 
taken by any governments during the period under study to try any of the successful military coup leaders 
and rulers for overthrowing a government or illegally running the state affairs. However, in two separate 
cases filed by individuals, the country’s Supreme Court declared the rule of Generals Zia and Ershad illegal 
(“Ershad's Takeover”, 2010) but there have not been any signs yet to try them for unseating a government or 
for illegally ruling the country. There were also some facts that reveal conscious efforts by both the political 
forces to manipulate future election results. The four-party alliance government led by BNP, during their 
2001-2006 tenure, appointed Justice Aziz as Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). Despite opposition from the 
BAL forces and a court ruling that the Election Commission’s job was to update the existing voter roll, not to 
prepare a fresh one, the Election Commission during Aziz’s tenure prepared a new voter list. Compared to the 
previous one, the number of voters on the new voter list increased 21.77 percent (Akram & Das, 2006). 
However, the Supreme Court in March 2007 cancelled that voter roll (“HC declares void electoral roll”, 2007). 
In December 2007, the High Court declared "illegal" the appointment of Justice MA Aziz as the chief election 
commissioner (“Aziz’s appointment as CEC”, 2007).  During the tenure of CEC Aziz, in 2005, the Election 
Commission recruited 300 field-level election officers who were allegedly selected on partisan basis (Akram 
& Das, 2006). After the departure of Aziz as CEC, and the BNP-led alliance government, all the election officers 
had to take a merit test but the people involved in such recruitment process have not yet been tried.  
 
The two political forces also have tussled over the composition of the caretaker government. A parliamentary 
election was supposed to be held in 2006 with the then last retired Chief Justice Hasan heading the CG. 
However the BAL forces alleged that the BNP-led government had increased the retirement age for judges 
from 65 to 67 in order to make sure Justice Hasan was the last retired Chief Justice and so he would be the 
                                                 
4
 For further details, see Maniruzzaman, 1992. 
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first person to have the opportunity to head the CG. In the face of violent protest by the BAL alleging that 
Justice Hasan was previously a BNP activist, Justice Hasan refused to head the CG. Then President Iajuddin 
Ahmed, who was elected as a BNP nominee, without trying other options specified in the constitution (South 
Sea Republic, n.d.), went straight away to the last option and made himself the head (Chief Advisor) of the CG. 
Then, amid strong Opposition protest led by the BAL, a so-called army-backed CG took over from the 
Iajuddin-led CG, going beyond the constitutional provision (“Iajuddin quits as chief adviser”, 2007) So far, any 
of these political corruptions have not been tried. Most recently, the country’s highest court cancelled the 
system of CG as it was not run by the elected representatives of the people and, thereby, the system went 
directly against the democratic spirit of the constitution. However, the court allowed the system for the next 
two general elections (“SC sets aside caretaker system”, 2011). Following the court verdict, the ruling BAL did 
not give way to the CG system for another two general elections and repealed the CG provision in the 
Constitution using their two-thirds majority in Parliament. BNP chief and the Leader of the Opposition in 
Parliament, Khaleda Zia, who is also a former Prime Minister has alleged that the ruling party cancelled the 
system of CG in a bid to win and cling to power by rigging next election scheduled to be held in early 2014 
(“Doors shut”, 2011). 
 
National political divide: In the discussion above, it is found that there has been a sharp national political 
divide in Bangladesh – one side led by the BAL forces and other side by anti-BAL forces. In addition, this 
divide has been the principal determinant of Bangladesh politics. Since the country’s liberation war, the BAL 
alone has generally been leading the BAL forces while the anti-BAL forces have been led by different parties, 
e.g. BNP and Jatiya Party (JP)5 or military rulers, e.g. General Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad at different 
points of time. According to our theory of national political divide, we observe that in the whole history of this 
country, two political forces -- the BAL forces and anti-BAL forces -- have been fighting or competing against 
each other in major political events, such as the war of independence in 1971, military coups in 1975, and 
elections. During the war of independence, the conflicting BAL forces and anti-BAL forces have emerged as 
pro- and anti-liberation forces respectively. The BAL forces led the liberation war while pro-Pakistani Islamic 
parties e.g. Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Muslim League (ML), led the anti-BAL forces and collaborated with 
Pakistani forces in a bid to block independence of Bangladesh. Through the August 1975 military coup, the 
BAL forces, i.e. the government headed by founder of the nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were ousted and 
anti-BAL forces led by a former BAL leader and unelected president, Khondker Mushtaque Ahmed, and some 
military officers (e.g. colonels Faruque and Rashid, and later General Ziaur Rahman) came to power. After the 
1991 democratic transition, an informal alliance of the BNP with JI played the key role in bringing the anti-
BAL forces to power in 1996 elections. In the 1996 July elections, enmity between these two main anti-BAL 
parties resulted in a win by the BAL forces. Again, the anti-BAL forces came to power when they were united 
under an alliance in 2001 elections.  So far, only the 2008 election results6 have seemed to be non-compliant 
to our theory of national political divide as the anti-BAL forces with their usual alliance failed to block the 
victory of the BAL-led alliance. However, this election was held under an army-backed CG and there was a 
non-established doubt in the political arena that whether the army-backed administration had somehow 
favoured the BAL in the election.  
 
These two political forces have apparently been leading two different political-psychological blocs.  We 
observe that generally the BAL has an appearance of secularism, and a belief in language and culturally based 
Bengali nationalism. The BAL believes that Mujib was the most commendable national political hero as he 
was the founder of the Bangladesh nation. It considered India as a priority friend in the region, and, at the 
same time, this party does not seem to be ready to accept Pakistan as friend. On the other hand, the anti-BAL 
parties are commonly opposed to secularism, Bengali nationalism, Sheikh Mujib as top national leader, and 
India as a friend. They support Islamic values and prioritise Pakistan as friend. They also have inherited 
                                                 
5
 Theoretically, we consider that the Ershad-led Jatiya Party has been a component of anti-BAL forces as this 
party has had the same religious political views as other anti-BAL parties e.g. BNP has had. However, 
practically, the JP has mostly been aligned with the BAL, as the JP founder General Ershad ousted the BNP 
government in a coup in 1982 and ruled the country till 1990. 
 
6 See Poll results 2008, n.d. 
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Pakistani political culture and heritage that included politics in the name of religion. During the rule of BNP 
founder General Zia, religious politics was reintroduced which the BAL banned soon after independence of 
the country (Huq, 1994). We argue that these have been the main features of Bangladeshi nationalism as 
against Bengali nationalism7. We have identified a number of generally conflicting characteristics of the BAL 
and anti-BAL forces that are shown in the Table 2. The BAL force characteristics have been observed mainly 
in the BAL However, some smaller parties, e.g. Communist party of Bangladesh, National Awami Party 
(Mozaffar), Workers Party (Menon), Jatyia Samajtantrik Dal (Inu), Ganatantri Party, etc, have had more or less 
of these characteristics. Since these parties have not had significant influence on the country’s politics and 
were seen aligned generally with the BAL, we would like to identify them as BAL force components. On the 
other hand, the BNP, JI, etc, and different individual military rulers more or less have boasted anti-BAL 
characteristics that put them under the category of anti-BAL forces. 
 
Table 2: Conflicting characteristics of BAL forces and anti-BAL forces 
BAL forces                        Anti-BAL forces                                                     
Secular                            Non-secular  
  Pro-Liberation   
 
Anti-Liberation or confusing                  
Pro-Mujib  
 
Anti-Mujib   
  Pro-India        
 
Anti-India  
  Anti-Pakistan 
 
Pro-Pakistan  
  Bengali nationalism Bangladeshi nationalism    
Sources of information: Huq, 1994; Hossain, 2001. 
  
Discussion: In the Introduction section, we identified some questions and hinted at a theory about 
democracy in Bangladesh. Accordingly, our findings presented above reveal that the country has been 
political-psychologically divided into two forces: one has inherited Pakistani political culture and heritage 
while the other one is with pride of 1971 independence war against Pakistan and anti-Pakistani political-
cultural orientation. These two forces are rigid on their own orientation and have been in confrontation since 
the country’s independence. In this study, democracy is found to be the by-product of their longstanding 
confrontation. Because of their arc-rivalry and distrust, they have not wanted any general elections held 
under each other’s administration and this was why they reached a consensus in 1990 on setting up the CG to 
administer future general elections in acceptable manners. This consensus generated united political 
movement in 1990 that caused downfall of General Ershad’s regime.  Afterwards, since 1991, the general 
elections have been held under the CG; and mainly because of generally accepted elections, democracy have 
been able to survive continued confrontational situation. It has been observed that any scientific innovation 
or discovery generally develop against the backdrop of a particular problem in a particular area. 
Development of political theories and institutions are not also different from this idea. Established old 
democracies e.g. the United States (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and India have developed under their own 
socio-economic-political circumstances. As a result, for example, British, Indian and Singaporean 
parliamentary systems are not exactly identical. Supremacy of British Parliament is the result of continuous 
fight between Parliament and the Monarch, which has led to weak judiciary.  On the other hand, Indian 
parliamentarianism is determined by the supremacy of the country’s Constitution, and court is the absolute 
interpreter of the Constitution as India is a multiethnic plural society that has a sort of federal system.  
Besides, it is hard to term Singapore a democracy as the People’s Action Party has been ruling the country for 
more than 4 decades although the country has inherited British parliamentary institutions since the colonial 
era. In Bangladesh, democratisation had to start under confrontational circumstances. This confronting 
situation essentially requires the system of CG for holding acceptable elections. This kind of election is held 
under outgoing party government in the traditional democracies. Therefore, Bangladesh democracy is not 
comparable with the traditional democracies, and traditional theory of democracy is not able to explain 
                                                 
7
 There is a view in the political arena of Bangladesh that Bangladeshi nationalism has emerged to 
theoretically include all the Bangladeshi non-Bengali ethnic groups and exclude Indian Bengali population. 
We observe that these two are at best weak elements of Bangladeshi nationalism as none of these has ever 
become a mainstream political issue. 
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Bangladesh democracy. We would like to call it-umpired democracy, because (1) general election is the only 
meaningful element of this democracy, and (2) the election is acceptable only when it is umpired by CG. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
What we call ‘umpired democracy’ in the Discussion section has actually been a ‘better’ way of power transfer 
from one government to another in an ‘undemocratic environment’. It is ‘better’ because the general elections 
held under caretaker governments have been generally free, fair and acceptable in comparison with the ones 
held under party governments before. It is an ‘undemocratic environment’ because, firstly, the caretaker 
government was neither run by people’s representatives, nor accountable to the people, and, secondly, the 
two confronting political forces have been out to fight each other in such ways where rules and norms of 
democracy have very often been violated indiscriminately. However, no single piece of research can hope to 
give a thorough answer to any question worth asking, and this study has some shortcomings that should be 
addressed with more research. For example, absence of military coup is a major reason for democracy to 
keep going but this study has not investigated why military has not taken over since 1990 in Bangladesh. 
Secondly, it is found in the study that democracy in Bangladesh has been surviving on the system of CG but 
this study has not carried out any sort of investigation into whether or not the people support the CG system. 
Thirdly, the system of CG, meanwhile, has been abolished but this paper has not focussed on future of the 
country’s democracy when the next general election will come up in early 2014. Future studies can cover 
these areas and, finally, look for a new system like CG that somehow represents people.     
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